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Abstract Debates in animal ethics are largely characterized by ethical monism,
the search for a single, timeless, and essential trait in which the moral standing of
animals can be grounded. In this paper, we argue that a monistic approach towards
animal ethics hampers and oversimplifies the moral debate. The value pluralism
present in our contemporary societies requires a more open and flexible approach to
moral inquiry. This paper advocates the turn to a pragmatic, pluralistic approach to
animal ethics. It contributes to the development of such an approach in two ways. It
offers a pragmatist critique of ethical monism in animal ethics and presents the
results of a qualitative study into the value diversity present in the different ways of
thinking about animals in the Netherlands. Carefully arranged group discussions
resulted in the reconstruction of four distinctive moral value frameworks that may
serve as instruments in the future process of moral inquiry and deliberation in the
reflection on animal use.
Keywords Animal ethics  Pragmatism  Value pluralism  Frame reflection 
Moral deliberation
Animals are present in human life. Throughout history, relationships between
humans and nonhuman animals have been existential to the meaning of cultural
experience. These relationships take different forms. We use animals to satisfy our
needs. We manage their lives and environments to conserve what we believe is a
part of natural life. We destroy them. Worship their magnificence. And we build
strong and intimate emotional connections with them as well. Still, it was only in
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recent times, that we have witnessed a significant rise in the philosophical reflection
on the moral aspects of these relationships. Since the 1970s, a vast increase of
publications in both the academic field of animal ethics as well as the public realm
demonstrates a growing concern for animal welfare and rights. The expansion of the
domain of moral consideration to animals is now widely acknowledged.
Currently, debates in animal ethics center on the question of how the moral
considerability of animals can be justified. Public debates about the use of animals
in food production, animal experimentation, or new emerging technologies present
us with different moral views on animals. These views might all entail a different
conception of moral considerability and, therefore, a different view on what is right
when it comes to the human treatment of animals. At the same time, philosophers
and ethicists appear to stumble on each other in their search for a single, timeless,
and essential trait in which the moral standing of animals can be grounded. This
approach, known as ethical monism, has turned the philosophical debate into an
abstract process of endlessly defending and refuting rival theories (Smith 2003). We
will argue in this paper that a monistic approach towards animal ethics hampers and
oversimplifies the moral debate. First, it does not recognize the value pluralism
present in our contemporary societies. Second, it disregards the complexity of the
morally problematic situations animal ethics is confronted with.
In line with a recent wave of philosophical pragmatism, which has attracted a
growing number of writers in animal ethics but particularly environmental ethics,
we believe the complexity of human experience requires a more open and flexible
approach to moral inquiry. According to Minteer and Manning (1999), the
pragmatic alternative celebrates value pluralism, accepting the historical context of
moral experience, and embraces an experimental approach to ethical claims. Light
and McKenna (2004), editors of ‘‘Animal pragmatism,’’ state that the strength of the
pragmatic alternative is being grounded in an approach that is pluralistic,
fallibilistic, and flexible. It can adapt to changing circumstances and practices,
because it is not tied to principles ‘‘that are too often divorced from people’s
everyday lived experience.’’
The paper we present here contributes to the development of a pragmatic,
pluralistic approach to animal ethics in two ways. First, we offer a pragmatist
critique of the abundant monism in animal ethics. Second, we discuss the ethical
relevance of the results of an empirical study into the value diversity present in the
different ways of thinking about animals in the Netherlands. Carefully arranged
group discussions resulted in the reconstruction of four distinctive frames that may
serve as instruments in the process of moral inquiry and deliberation.
Ethical Monism in Animal Ethics
Ethical monism is the belief that there is a single, comprehensive, and systematic
account of morality that can end indeterminacy and value conflict (Smith, 2003). It
aims for a unifying principle or set of principles that enables judgment of morally
problematic situations by evaluating competing values against overarching criteria.
This desire for a single ethical theory for the justification of our interactions with the
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world is not something unique to animal ethics. The quest for a universal ethical
truth is common within mainstream moral philosophy (Williams, 1996). It
dominates a long tradition exemplified by the identification and justification of
general principles that will resolve the conflicts between the incompatible claims of
different traditions. Nevertheless, also in the field of animal ethics the disputes
between opposing ethical theories and traditions are abundant. Although these
traditions rely on different and sometimes contradictory arguments, their basic
concern is the same: justification of the moral value of the animal on neutral
grounds (Aaltola 2005).
Monism in animal ethics centers on the justification of the claim that animals are
proper objects of moral consideration. Many philosophers have proposed that there
is something intrinsically valuable about the animal. An intrinsic value is valuable
as an end-in-itself, not merely as a means to another end. There is on-going
disagreement, however, about what quality or entity we should regard as the end-in-
itself. Is it the animal itself? Its genome? Or its interests and needs? The literature
on animal ethics contains many elaborated and worthwhile accounts of the moral
considerability of animals (Armstrong and Botzler, 2003; Garner 2005). Here, we
will briefly outline the arguments of a few important contributors. We do not mean
to provide an extensive discussion of their arguments here. We merely want to put
forward that although these arguments build on different criteria for moral
considerability, they share a similar structure: the monistic justification of
considerability in one, single moral standard. Take for example the moral standard
of animal suffering, as proposed by Singer’s utilitarianism. According to Singer
(1990) sentient beings, able to experience states of pain and pleasure, should not be
exposed to (unnecessary) suffering. But how can we know where to draw the line
between the domain of sentient beings (that deserve our moral consideration) and
the domain of non-sentient beings? Singer’s forceful line of reasoning resulted in a
vast amount of literature about the extent to which certain animals have conscious
experience and therefore, moral status. Regan, another important contributor to
animal ethics, argues that animals are something more than the ‘‘vessels of sentient
welfare’’ utilitarians make of them (Regan 1986). His deontological theory of
animal rights maintains that it is not the interest that matters, but the individual
animal that has the interest. Because animals are subjects of life, we have to respect
them as ends-in-themselves (Regan 1988). Also here, we would have to decide on
what it means to be a subject of life. Regan refers to beings that have beliefs and
desires and the ability to evaluate their own lives. Other theorists, like Taylor
(1986), however, contend that all living beings are a subject of a life. Rollin, another
main player in the animal ethics field, has adopted an evolutionary version of the
Aristotelian concept of telos, which refers to the unique, evolutionary shaped set of
needs and interests that charaterizes an animal (Rollin 1989). Also, the concept of
telos, however, is surrounded by persisting discussions about its teleological nature
and the question whether the telos itself or the forthcoming interests and needs have
to be regarded as the ends-in-themselves (Holland 1995).
In the attempt to ground the respect for animals in a single and fundamental
ethical concept, some aspect of the animal that is an end-in-itself, philosophical
debates about the value of animals appear to run into a number of epistemological
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and metaphysical problems and enduring disagreements. Also Smith (2003),
evaluating the role of ethical monism in environmental ethics, observed that not
only in environmental ethics itself but also in the broader field of moral philosophy
the main preoccupation of philosophers seems to be the defense and refutation of
competing systematic theories. In the pursuit of irrefutable arguments, he indicated,
thought experiments have become more and more hypothetical, trying to create an
ethical theory that can deal with all potential situations. Like Musschenga (1992)
noted, it seems impossible that philosophers will ever find conclusive arguments to
‘‘end such debates, not even those inside themselves.’’ The quest for a single,
systematic theory to guide our ethical judgments presumably originates from the
desire to overcome the conflict and indeterminacy present in many of the complex
moral situations we have to deal with. In line with Smith (2003), we argue that
ethical monism rather limits the necessary consideration of the variety of
relationships between humanity and non-human nature.
A Pragmatist’s Approach Towards the Value of Animals
In recent years, monistic approaches have been criticized by a new wave of
pragmatists for their failure to get a full grasp on the complexity and diversity of
real morally problematic situations (Keulartz et al. 2003; Andrew Light and Katz
1996; Minteer and Manning 1999). These writers are inspired by the school of
philosophical pragmatism, originating from the work of Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, and John Dewey in the late 19th and early 20th century. In this
section, we will argue that philosophical pragmatism, and mainly the work of John
Dewey, may offer some fruitful options to deal with the flaws of ethical monism.
Dewey’s Reconstruction of Ethics
Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism is known for its anti-foundational character. He
conceived of reality as a process, characterized by continuity, contingence, and
change (Dewey 1920). Hence, he firmly rejected the search for absolute foundations
or absolute truths. All our convictions have a provisional nature and should remain
susceptible to critical appraisal. Dewey (1932) strongly objected to the habit of
moral philosophy to treat its favored categories and distinctions as if they were real
existing entities, independent of any context and its human interpretation. He
criticized the view of morality as an external, autonomous domain, independent of
the context of moral experience. Dewey, on the contrary, emphasized the central
role of experience in the development of our relations and interactions with the
world around us. Through experience we become aware of a moral problem.
Minteer et al. (2004) pointed out that the role of past experience is important in
Dewey’s philosophical program because it continues to demonstrate our persistent
struggle with the presence of conflicting values in our moral judgment, due to the
complexity of a morally problematic situation. Dewey regarded the tendency to
absolutize ethics as a failure to see that any meaningful inquiry occurs within the
unique context of a situation. He criticized traditional approaches to the dilemmas of
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moral experience for not recognizing the complexity of morally problematic
situations as well as the novel demands and circumstances of new situations
(Minteer et al. 2004). The first important element in Dewey’s reconstruction of
ethics is a transfer of its focus from the justification of absolute moral principles to
the inquiry of morally problematic situations.
Dewey regarded the uncritical approval of fixed notions and ideas as extremely
unproductive. The complexity of human experience much rather requires an
experimental, open, and flexible method of moral inquiry. In order to meet the
demands of morally problematic situations arising in our experience, we have to
develop creative-intelligent responses to these situations. The importance of creative-
intelligent inquiry is the second important element of Dewey’s reconstruction of
ethics. It testifies to a firm belief in the ability of individuals (and communities) to
examine the needs of a problematic situation and reconstruct the moral resources
accumulated in experience in order to critically appraise and evaluate it (Minteer et al.
2004). This relates to the third aspect of Dewey’s reconstruction of ethics. The way
moral experience is ‘‘felt’’ and ‘‘lived’’ is always constructed in relation to other
members of a moral community. The undeniably social context of morality, therefore,
not only requires individual reflection but also public deliberation.
Dewey’s Critique of Monism
Because of the complex and changing circumstances of those situations, Dewey’s
radical pragmatism rejects the monistic application of a single principle or set of
principles developed prior to reflection on morally problematic situations. In
Dewey’s view moral principles should be seen as only a part of the entire process of
appraisal and inquiry into our moral experience of problematic situations (Dewey
and Tufts 1932). A priori selection of one (or a few) of them would merely hamper
open intelligent moral inquiry. Minteer et al. (2004) has argued that, in understanding
the open-ended nature of moral experience, philosophical pragmatism embraces the
truth of value pluralism. Since there is no a priori, context-independent way to rank
the diverse values present in our moral experience, Minteer proceeded, morally
problematic situations will have to be resolved by practical deliberations of those
values. This does not mean that moral values or principles have to be dismissed. They
are merely conceived of as hypothetical solutions to a morally problematic situation.
In such a way, the ‘‘rightness’’ of a moral claim does not depend on the intrinsic
nature of a value or principle underlying this claim, but on the extent to which it
contributes to the resolution of specific morally problematic situations. This
contribution can only be determined in a process of thoughtful and reflective inquiry.
Minteer concludes that ethical theories in a pragmatic sense are seen as critical
tools—instruments—for analyzing and interpreting moral problems and conflicts,
not fixed ends or positions that we have to grant some privileged philosophical status.
Ethics as a Process of Inquiry and Deliberation
Traditionally, the focus of animal ethics has been substantive, aimed at the
justification of the moral considerability of animals. Dewey’s fear was that fixed
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ends, because of their a priori, absolutist, and foundational character, would merely
obstruct moral inquiry. If one looks at the value debates in animal ethics, Dewey’s
fear, at least to some extent, became reality. The standards for grounding the
individual value of the animal are often treated as non-negotiable ends-in-
themselves. In their attempts to justify these standards, philosophers end up in
endless boundary and definition discussions. In the meantime, a rich diversity of
values that can have a meaningful relation to the problematic situation at hand is
precluded from thoughtful inquiry and deliberation. Dewey’s reconstruction of
ethics results in a procedural view of ethics in which values and principles emerge
through the method of experimental inquiry and deliberation. It redefines ethics as a
particular way of solving moral problems. It suggests that we should address the
moral conflicts in animal ethics as practical disputes that demand for cooperative
inquiry and deliberation rather than abstract philosophical debates (Minteer 2004).
The Value Lab Method: Interactive Exploration of Value Frameworks
The first step in a pragmatic approach to animal ethics would be creating the space
for a process of moral inquiry into the intuitions, values, and beliefs of the cultural
contexts in which our interactions with animals take place. This paper presents the
empirical results of a study into the value pluralism present in the ways of thinking
about animals in the Netherlands. To this end, we developed a deliberative
instrument that we dubbed the value lab tool. Application of the value lab tool
facilitated the joint reflection of a broad range of Dutch citizens on their values and
beliefs regarding animals and the human- animal relationship. The meaning of those
values and beliefs do not exist as mental entities in the minds of people, but are
actively negotiated and constructed during the course of social interaction
(Burningham 1995; Potter and Wetherell 1987). Given this relational construction
of beliefs, Waterton and Wynne (1999) have recommended a more reflexive
framework for research into the meaning of values and beliefs. The method of focus
groups has in recent years become recognized as this site of social interaction
through which meaning and understanding are co-constructed (Barbour and
Kitzinger 1999; Madriz 2000). The value lab method we have developed merges
the idea of social interaction in focus groups with an explicit in-depth focus on
underlying value frameworks. In the small discussion group setting of the value lab,
participants acted as co-researchers, inductively constructing their own frames of
reference. The methodological steps taken to facilitate the participants’ philosoph-
ical reflection on their own ways of thinking and the subsequent reconstruction of
value frameworks have been elaborately reported and discussed in another paper
(Kupper et al. 2007). Here, we will merely address the main methodological choices
that were made.
Creating a Conversational Context
The discussion setting needed to fulfill two conditions. First, it had to be a
thrustworthy and non-threatening environment in which participants feel at ease and
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open to freely express their thoughts and beliefs. Second, it needed to facilitate in-
depth exploration of what was brought up; ultimately producing images of the
underlying value frameworks. We accomplished this setting through the imple-
mentation of two guiding principles. We strived for homogeneity in the discussion
groups and worked with structured exercises. In addition, the discussions were
moderated by experienced and skilled group facilitators.
Participant Selection and Group Composition
The selection of participants explicitly aimed at the qualitative variation—not the
statistical representativeness of ideas about animals. We were interested in a
so-called cognitive representation of the diversity of viewpoints. Therefore, we
strived for homogeneity within the groups and heterogeneity between the groups.
We selected participants through a wide range of social organizations associated
with certain viewpoints on the animal issue. However, we did not select the official
representatives of those groups or movements and explicitly addressed the
participants as citizens with their own sets of values and concerns. The groups
were composed by comparing various criteria to establish groups of (more or less)
congenial minds. Of course, the collected material of the group discussions was
used afterwards to analyze the actual perspectives on animal issues. All sessions
were organized between January 26 and April 8, 2004. The workshops were held in
different regions of the Netherlands, geographically spread across the country. The
16 value lab sessions ranged in size from 5 to 11 participants but contained a total
number of 109 participants. Our methodological paper has addressed the issues of
selection, composition, and representation more profoundly.
Workshop Design
The value lab design was standardized for all groups and semi-structured. Each
group discussion was 2–3 h in duration. Sessions were recorded on video and audio
tape for further analysis. All participants consented to these recordings on
conditions of anonymity and restricted use of the recordings just for the purpose
of this study. The collective activity of the group consisted of a step-by-step circling
in on the variety and richness of ideas. The group conversation gradually moved
from intuitions to the articulation and systematization of value concepts through the
repetitive use of structuring exercises. Through this process of inquiry, the
participants constructed an interrelated network of the concepts they particularly
valued about animals, framed in their language and their ways of viewing the world.
Frame Reconstruction: Qualitative Analysis
Subsequently, we as the researchers reconstructed the value frameworks in which
the group stories were grounded, adopting a grounded theory approach (Baarda
et al. 2005; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Coding and analysis of the discussion
material was an iterative process in a continuous exchange between raw data and the
analytical categorizations researchers developed during the study. Different
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members of the coding team independently and jointly coded the transcript
fragments into value concepts and categories. As the methodological paper
elaborately explains, the cycles of independent analysis and joint interpretation have
warranted the shared interpretative validity of research process and products
(Kupper et al. 2007). During the value lab sessions and subsequent analysis it
quickly became clear that although each group went through its unique process,
there were marked similarities and differences at a conceptual level. Systematic
interpretation of those similarities and differences rendered four distinctive value
patterns.
Framing Issues: Making Meaning
We defined the resulting patterns, the reconstructed value frameworks as moral
‘‘frames of reference.’’ The concept of ‘‘frame’’ is used in several theoretical
traditions, such as cognitive psychology, social movement studies and policy
analysis, as summarized by Swaffield (1998). According to Scho¨n and Rein (1994),
frames are particular ways of making sense of a complex reality and guiding our
actions. They consist of structures of values and beliefs about a certain situation or
object. When individuals describe or define the ‘‘same’’ situation or object using
different concepts and language, they are using different frames (Douglas 1986).
Also the frames of animal value provide the constructs and patterns to make the
animal itself and the human- animal relationship meaningful to ourselves and
others. It is important to note that these frames, as Fisher (1997) has argued, are
‘‘unfinished constructions.’’ Frames are representations of meaning that belong to a
social rather than individual level. They are selectively used whenever actors like a
farmer, policy-maker, or citizen articulate their interests and ideas about animals. At
the same time, the actors’ interests as well as the changing context of discussion
influence the way they frame a situation. In communicative action regarding animal
issues, frames are continually produced and reproduced. Furthermore, although
perhaps everyone uses preferred frames, other context may invoke—in the same
person—a use of language and concepts belonging to one of the other frames. In this
study, we explicitly do not embrace an a priori relation between a particular frame
and a particular individual or social group. Like Layder (1997) commented with
regard to social representations of meaning, they have an ‘‘existence above and
beyond the consciousness and intentionalities of people.’’
Four Frameworks of Animal Value
The analysis of the value lab discussion material produced four distinctive value
frameworks, comprising both a descriptive sense (a vision on what the animal is) and a
normative sense (a vision on why animals are important and how humans should treat
animals). The frameworks were named after their central value concept: ‘‘Use,’’
‘‘Relation,’’ ‘‘Balance,’’ and ‘‘Source.’’ The next paragraph will discuss the different
frameworks in detail. First, we will focus on the system of value categories that were
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inductively developed from the discursive materials produced by the value lab
sessions. Each of the frameworks contains a specific set of interrelated moral value
categories. Together, these categories represent the diversity of values observed in the
reflection on animals in the Netherlands. Table 1 shows the list of value categories.
Also their definitions are inductively developed from the value lab discussions.
The value categories relate to elements of the animal itself or the human- animal
relationship and each contain a subset of values. Broadly, these ‘‘values’’ are defined
as those features of the animal or the human- animal relationship that our
participants cared about that mattered to them. In each of the four frameworks we
have reconstructed all 10 major value categories are recognized. The frameworks
however, differ significantly with respect to the relative weight they attribute to
these categories. This is visualized in Fig. 1.
Each of the frameworks consists of a differentiated structure of animal values.
Like Douglas (1986) noted, the same ‘‘object,’’ in this case the animal and its
relationships to humans and the surrounding world, is defined in a different way,
using different concepts. In this sense, the frameworks each provide a specific
perspective on the animal. The USE framework primarily approaches the animal as
a member of its species, whereas the RELATION framework recognizes the
individual animal. The BALANCE framework emphasizes the animal’s role in
living (eco)systems, while the SOURCE framework defines the animal as a
manifestation of the greater whole. This perspective on the animal has its
consequences for the direction of the human- animal relationship. The USE
framework is characterized by an ‘‘I-it’’ perspective. The animal is objectified,
looked at from a distance. The meaning of the animal is colored by the interests of
the human agent or by a greater human cause or concern. The RELATION
Table 1 Value categories that constitute the different value frameworks
Value category Definition
Capacity Elements of an animal’s biological structure or function
Individuality Distinctive kind of character and behavior that make the animal a unique
organism
Use Human use of animals, at the expense of the animal
Functionality Human use of animals, while the animal itself either derives a benefit too or is not
significantly harmed.
Being Way the animal is in-the-world and relates itself to its environment.
Life Continued existence of the animal on earth, in interaction with other forms of life
and the environment.
Experience Human mental state evoked by the perception of, or the interaction with, animals.
Bond Personal connectedness or dependence when humans and animals live together.
Naturalness Background of a system able to develop itself into what it is without human
interference.
Spirituality Reference to a supernatural force in the lives of animals and their relationships
with animals.
System Whole of which the parts show interconnectedness and interdependence to such a
degree that they can not be perceived separately anymore.
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framework recognizes the animal itself as an individual component of the bond
between humans and animals, resulting in an ‘‘I-you’’ perspective. It is an
asymmetrical relationship, however, in which the hierarchy is set. The BALANCE
framework on the other hand emphasizes that humans and animals are part of the
same system of life. Seeking a balance between human and animal needs, the
individual is perceived as less important than the common interest in the system,
resulting in an ‘‘I-WE’’ perspective. The SOURCE frame too holds a holistic
perspective, the ‘‘I-THOU’’ perspective. However, the individual animal is also
important here. According to the SOURCE frame, the supremacy of the greater
whole is manifested not only at the level of the whole itself, but in every individual
animal. Table 2 shows the different ways in which the animal and the human-
animal relationship are defined. The next paragraphs will explain the four
frameworks in detail.
Use: The Animal Objectified
The USE framework is characterized by two distinctive features. It is human-
centered and the animal is objectified to the level of its species, resulting in the I-it
perspective. Also in a single animal, not the individual but the general is what is
perceived and appreciated. Certain qualities of the animal offer the opportunity to
use the animal for human benefit. A dog’s build makes it a good guard. The most
salient is the use of animals for the production of food and other consumption goods
like clothing. This use of animals as a resource for human needs is accepted as a
natural and necessary phenomenon.
Fig. 1 The four frameworks (grey) and the 10 main value categories. All value categories are
recognized in every framework. The relative importance of a value category in a particular framework is
illustrated by the distance between the value category and that framework. ‘‘Naturalness,’’‘for example,
plays a role in the USE and RELATION frameworks, but is more profoundly present in the BALANCE and
SOURCE frameworks
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The fact that people use animals is an element of biology. Both are part of the
biological food chain.
Next to a natural resource, the animal is also perceived as a valuable source of
knowledge. The USE framework recognizes the benefits of using animals for
scientific experiments and product-testing in, for example, the pharmaceutical
industry. Although the use of animals for human benefits is seen as important, this
does not mean that humans can do anything they like with animals. They have to treat
animals in a responsible way, paying attention to their health and welfare. However,
the health and welfare of the animal and human benefits often go hand in hand:
Production animals are living beings. Therefore you should take care of them.
If you do that, you will get something in return. They are your livelihood.
Here, the value of ‘‘animal welfare is primarily rooted in its ability to satisfy the
productive needs of human beings. This is a recurring phenomenon in the USE
framework. Values that refer to features of the animal itself, or its natural
environment, are primarily appreciated for their instrumentality in the fulfillment of
human needs. Another example is provided by the frequent reference to the
biological capacities of animals, both with respect to structure and function.
The ingenious complexity of animals makes them interesting as an object of
study.
The USE framework greatly appreciates the animal’s internal complexity.
Examples the sometimes exceptional perceptual and cognitive capacities. Simul-
taneously, these capacities form a starting point of scientific research and food
production.
The USE framework constructs the nature of the animal in terms of its biological
structure and its function in a human-centered environment. The animal is not
perceived as an individual being, but as ‘‘an animal,’’ a member of a species. This
Table 2 Four different framings of animal meaning
Frame Use Relation Balance Source
Direction I-it I-you I-WE I- THOU
Animal relation
experience
relation
experience
functionality
individuality
individuality
being
Species capacity
use
functionality
Ecosystem life naturalness
Whole system naturalness
system
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conveys the technical-instrumental rationality that is characteristic of the USE
framework.
Relation: The Animal Personalized
The bond between humans and animals is at the heart of the RELATION
framework. The animal is defined in relation to a human being. Although animals
and humans live together, the hierarchy is set. The asymmetrical relationship is
primarily conceived as functional to the satisfaction of human needs, which results
in the I-you perspective.
Nature and character of the animal can be employed for all kinds of purpose.
It is important to note that this type of use is different from the type most
frequently referred to in the Use framework. In the RELATION framing, humans do
benefit from the use of animals, but either not at the cost of or beneficial to the
animal itself. Therefore we labeled this kind of use as ‘‘functionality.’’ An example
of functionality is the support an animal companion grants its owner. One of the
group discussion participants expressed it as follows:
The contact with animals has a positive influence on both the physical and
mental health of people.
The functionality of the animal refers to a type of use that relates to the
perception of the animal as an individual being. In the RELATION framework the
animal is personalized, appreciated for its individual qualities and contributions to
the relationship. This is another typical difference with the USE framework, in
which animals are approached as members of a species. The RELATION
framework treats every animal as an individual character. Its features, be it that
they are often appreciated for their functionality, are perceived to constitute the
individuality of the animal.
Every animal has its own character, built up from a diversity of traits. This is
something you can take pleasure in.
Note that this quote not only refers to individuality but also to the value category
of ‘‘experience.’’ This category, one of the main categories of the RELATION
framework, is defined as the human mental state evoked by the perception of, or the
interaction with, animals. It contains concepts like the animal’s beauty, adorability
but also creepiness. Also the caressability of the animal, a notion frequently
encountered in debates about animal issues, belongs to this category.
Finally, one of the most important elements of the RELATION framework is the
personal bond between humans and animals.
You can really develop a personal connection with an animal.
When humans and animals live together, a deeper connection can develop in
which both human and animal become involved.
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It is hard to maintain a distant relationship with an animal. You will get
emotionally involved.
Balance: The Animal Naturalized
The value categories ‘‘system’’ and ‘‘life’’ are two of the most important categories of
the BALANCE framework. Often in the group discussions, values were expressed
that refer to both categories at the same time, for example the ‘‘interconnectedness of
life.’’ Central to the BALANCE framework is the I-WE perspective, based on the
observation that animals and humans are part of the same system of life.
All life on earth is interconnected in an indissoluble way.
The value of the greater whole is appreciated. The interdependence of animals
and humans means they cannot exist without each other and the system as a whole.
It is important to note, however, that the BALANCE framework approached the
system of life in a naturalistic sense. It refers to biological (eco-)systems in which
every inhabitant has its own functions and needs.
An animal acquires its own place in the ecosystem; it plays a functional role in
the maintenance of that system.
The BALANCE framework recognizes the fact that animals are alive. It not only
refers to basal biological phenomena as breathing, feeding, and reproduction, but
also to the animal’s conscious awareness of its environment and of what happens to
them; to the animal’s capacity for feeling. Animal consciousness does not mean
they foresee the consequences of their actions. Rather, they live in the here and now
and react instinctively. Unlike humans, they act spontaneously and authentically.
The animal is always genuine in its appearance; it presents itself like it truly is.
A third feature of the animal that is particularly valued is the naturalness of the
animal. In contrast to the USE and RELATION frameworks, the animal is not
defined in relation to human ends, but as the product of an evolutionary
development in interaction with its environment.
An animal exists in the interaction with its natural environment by showing its
natural behavior.
According to the BALANCE framework the animal’s reason for existence is the
animal itself, not the fulfillment of human ends. As a consequence, the optimal life
environment for an animal would be a natural environment. Here the animal can
behave in a natural way.
Also the USE and RELATION frameworks have a descriptive and a normative
sense. In the case of the BALANCE framework, however, the normativity becomes
more explicit.
We should leave animals alone. In that way, they can live their own life and
behave in their own natural way.
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Recognizing that an animal has a natural way of living has the normative
implication that we should adjust our own behavior in order to enable animals to
live their own natural lives. Both humans and animals are perceived to be
inhabitants of this planet. The existence of the one cannot be with the existence of
the other. In the BALANCE framing, this situation implies that both humans and
animals should give and take.
Source: The Animal Mystified
In the SOURCE framework, both the individuality of every single animal and its
interconnectedness with the whole of existence play a very important role. It is
impossible to separate them because both features spring from the ‘‘source’’ of
existence. Individuality and interconnectedness in the SOURCE framework refer to
some kind of universal order and are perceived as essential traits of the animal’s
identity.
Animals have a personal character and an identity of their own. Their behavior
follows what lives inside them.
Note the difference with the RELATION framing in which the animal’s identity
is personalized. In the SOURCE framing it is mystified. The animal’s nature and
character provide it with a unique identity, which is seen as fundamental to the
animal’s being in the world.
Animals express themselves in the way they want to, the way that fits them. It
is characteristic for them to take this freedom.
The SOURCE framework values the animal’s own way of expressing itself as a
kind of fundamental beauty, present in all animals.
An animal is naive; it lives like a child, without negative thoughts or feelings
of guilt.
Also the naturalness of the animal is valued in the SOURCE framework. More
than is the case in the perspective of the BALANCE framework, the naturalness of
the animal contributes to its individuality.
Animals are able to live a life in contact with the earth and with nature. They
develop a kind of behavior characteristic for their species.
Living together in a natural group—especially parents and children- is essential
for life and development of an animal. It grants the animal its identity.
The value category ‘‘system’’ is deeply appreciated in the SOURCE framework.
This is another element of the framework in which it is comparable to the BALANCE
framework. However, there is a difference. Although both frameworks share a
holistic perspective, the holism of the BALANCE framework is more rational,
whereas the holism of the SOURCE framework is more spiritual. The BALANCE
framework talks about the functional role of every organism in the system of life. The
SOURCE framework talks about the necessary interconnectedness of everything that
444 F. Kupper, T. De Cock Buning
123
exists. In the SOURCE framing, the greater whole is perceived as incomprehensible
to the human mind. This insight demands respect and reticence. Breaking the
essential bond between humans, animals, and the earth will eventually strike back.
An animal is an essential part of a complex, interwoven ecosystem.
Both humans and animals are essential parts of a greater, interconnected
whole. Affecting any animal will eventually lead to disintegration of the
whole.
Also the naturalness of the animal is established by its connectedness to the
greater whole. In the perspective of the Source framework, the animal is seen as a
manifestation of the wonder of existence. Humans can only humbly participate.
In the reasoning of the Source framework, whenever we use animals, respect for
the animal’s individuality and its interconnectedness with all of existence should be
the guiding principle.
There is a strong sense that in the current situation humans deprive animals of
their space to live. Whereas in fact, the animal’s freedom to live its own life should
be preserved.
Animals have to be able to be whatever they want to, regardless of the acts of
others.
Many animals in this country live in captivity. Whereas actually, they should
be able to live their lives in freedom.
According to the Source framework, the animal’s own needs should be taken into
account in every way that we as humans make use of animals.
Humans should not neglect the needs of animals. This is humiliating to them.
The normative sense of the Source framework is largely present in many of the
values that are appreciated. Appreciation of the animal’s freedom for example
immediately restricts the acceptable actions of humans.
Animal Ethics in the Face of Pluralism
In the beginning of this paper we discussed a tendency towards ethical monism: the
desire for a single and comprehensive animal ethic that will guide all our actions
regarding animals and the human- animal relationship. Our pragmatist critique of
this tendency explored its problematic aspects and offered an alternative, pluralistic
conception of the value of animals. The four value frameworks that we have
reconstructed through the value lab sessions render a rich understanding of the range
of animal values present in the reflection on animals in the Netherlands. Each of the
reconstructed frameworks produces specific and contextual meanings of the value of
animal, providing a strong validation of value pluralism in the reflection on animal
issues in the Netherlands. In this section, the consequences of the observed value
pluralism for animal ethics will be discussed.
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Recognizing Value Pluralism
Smith (2003) indicated that value pluralism, as it is commonly understood in
contemporary philosophy, rests on two ideas: the incompatibility of values and the
incommensurability of values (Nagel 1979; Williams 1981). The incompatibility
of values occurs when two (or more) possible ideals cannot be fulfilled at the
same time. Smith refers to it as the human condition. Conflicts between
incompatible values are numerously present in our moral experience, also with
regard to animal issues. Such conflicts may occur not only between persons, but
also within a single person. We indeed observed participants of the value lab
sessions simultaneously appreciating different values of the animal that are
difficult to reconcile and that pull them in contradictory directions. Ethical
monism, proposed to expel this uncertainty and settle conflicts, needlessly limits
the broad range of interactions between humans and animals and thereby
misrepresents the diversity of moral experiences and values. Furthermore, seeing
that others share the same conflicts of values, be it that they arrive at a different
judgment, might improve mutual understanding.
The second element of value pluralism, the incommensurability of values, turns
directly to ethical monism. Incommensurability refers to the absence of an
overarching value against which competing values can be weighed and evaluated
(Smith 2003). It occurs when communication across theories, vocabularies, or
perspectives is disturbed and rational assessment difficult or impossible (Furrow,
1995). Smith indicates that also Williams (1981) has argued that the incommen-
surability of values entails that not every conflict of values can be rationally
resolved. He goes onto say that this does not yet imply a commitment to a radical
incomparability of values. It means that conflicting values can not necessarily be
reduced to each other or to an external standard. If we look at the different framings
of the value of animals reconstructed in this study, the incommensurability of those
framings is apparent. What universal standard could justify a choice between the I-
it perspective of the USE framework and the I-you perspective of the RELATION
framework? Both of these frameworks will produce a different judgment of, say,
the use of animals for laboratory experiments. In both frameworks, knowledge
benefits, health benefits, animal suffering, or the intrusion of animal lives acquires a
different weight and the situation will be judged by appealing to different criteria.
Both frameworks exhibit their own internal rationality.
Beyond the Dichotomy of Value Conflicts
Another problematic aspect of traditional animal ethics is that value conflicts
regarding the human treatment of animals are often conceptualized as a conflict
between values that represent the needs, interests, or rights of humans and values
represent the needs, interests, or rights of animals. The dichotomous framing
construes participants in the moral debate as adversaries on either side of a
dilemma. The value pluralism observed in this study demonstrates that this
dichotomy oversimplifies our response to the morally problematic dimensions of
the situation we are confronted with. First of all, it is important to note that within
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each of the reconstructed frameworks, a mixture of values is expressed (see
Fig. 1). Furthermore, the role of a certain value in moral judgment will eventually
be determined by the meaning that value acquires in its contextual relation to
other values. The concept of naturalness, for example, is acknowledged by all four
frameworks as an important aspect of the animal’s life. The frameworks, however,
differ in the contextual meaning of that concept for the human- animal
relationship. In the USE framework, the value category ‘‘naturalness’’ is related
to the categories of ‘‘functionality’’ and ‘‘use,’’ constructing ‘‘naturalness’’ as a
necessary condition for the fulfillment of human needs. In the BALANCE
framework the naturalness of the animal is primarily related to the value category
of ‘‘life’’ and ‘‘system’’ perceived as a necessary condition for a good life of the
animal itself, whereas the RELATION framework emphasizes the human
experience of an animal’s naturalness. The SOURCE framework recognizes a
final purpose in the animal’s naturalness, as it is connected to the categories of
‘‘spirituality’’ and ‘‘being.’’ As a result, all four frameworks differ in the
normative implications that are attributed to the concept of naturalness, some are
instrumental towards the fulfillment of human needs, others are not. Ultimately,
the way in which a certain concept is guiding moral inquiry depends on the
configuration of the entire framework it is positioned in. As a result of the
dichotomous framing of moral debates about the treatment of animals, different
moral positions become fixed positions and the associated values perceived and
treated as ends-in-themselves. The different interpretations of ‘‘naturalness’’
indicate, however, that a value concept can play a meaningful part in different
framings of the value of animals.
Frame Reflection
In his examination of value pluralism in environmental ethics, Smith (2003)
concludes that ‘‘value conflicts and dilemmas are not pathological.’’ They are an
integral part of the moral life of both individuals and groups. The question remains
how moral judgments should be made in the context of value pluralism. Dewey’s
reconstruction of ethics views moral life as an explicit process of cooperative
conflict resolution. In the context of relationships between humans and animals,
most public conflicts involve multiple stakeholders, each of them framing the value
of animals, and therefore, the moral problem at hand, in a different way. The value
frameworks reconstructed in this study exemplify these different ways of framing.
They imply entrenched disagreements about values, interests, and ideals. To
understand how cooperative conflict resolution can be practiced in the context of
those deeply entrenched public conflicts, we return to the concept of framing as put
forward in the work of another pragmatist, Donald Scho¨n. The discursive materials
of the value lab demonstrate that the plurality of perspectives present in the
reflection on animals in the Netherlands results in various ‘‘problem-setting stories,’’
in which people convey what is wrong and right. These problem-setting stories are
grounded in different, in some ways conflicting, frames. According to Scho¨n, these
different, conflicting frames are the reason that such public conflicts seem
intractable controversies (Scho¨n 1979). He argues that those kind of problems are
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in need of frame restructuring: the process by which we ‘‘respond to frame conflict
by constructing a new problem-setting story, one in which we attempt to integrate
conflicting frames by including features and relations drawn from earlier stories’’
(Scho¨n 1979, p. 270). A crucial condition for frame restructuring is frame reflection,
achieving understanding of one’s own framing of a problem and (possible)
differences with the framings of others. The concept of frame reflection revives the
Deweyan theme of the creative and constructive resolution of conflicts in public life.
According to Keulartz et al. (2002) this reflexive attitude is precisely what is needed
to sustain a pragmatist ideal of equal coexistence of plural perspectives. They argue
that ‘‘conflicting parties have to appreciate the facts that they are competing for
primacy within the same universe of discourse with others that cannot beforehand
be branded as unreasonable. Such reflexive awareness rejects the naivety of
dogmatic beliefs, recognizes its own fallibility and leaves room for ‘resonable
dissensus’.’’
Inquiry and Deliberation in Animal Ethics
Reflexive awareness is of course a naturally occurring phenomenon of public life.
However, in the light of cooperative resolution of value conflicts in animal ethics,
reflexive awareness has to be explicitly facilitated. It requires a deliberative attitude.
Like Dewey advocated, it requires the critical appraisal of the values and beliefs of
oneself and others. Minteer (2001) noted that Dewey’s philosophical project
demonstrates a strong faith in the ability of human experience to produce from
within itself the justification of values and beliefs. Moral deliberation in this view
ultimately rests on the potential of individuals to collectively engage in the creative-
intelligent activity of moral inquiry. It is the role of animal ethics to facilitate this
collective engagement in a process of moral inquiry and open democratic
deliberation. Also Beekman and Brom (2007) have argued that in pluralist
democracies it is important to design ethics as a platform for value debates. This
approach to animal ethics requires the development of experimental methods and
instruments for frame-reflective inquiry and public deliberation. The value lab tool,
applied in this study, can be understood as such a deliberative instrument. The value
frameworks produced in the value labs can be used as heuristic tools for
understanding the philosophical relationships between different ethical positions in
the animal ethics debates. They serve as contextual means of inquiry, providing
structuring insight into the morally problematic dimensions of the pluralistic social
context in which the human treatment of animals takes place. As such, these
frameworks can be used to arrange, structure, and facilitate new deliberations on
animal issues.
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